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Measuring Competition using the Boone Relative Profit Difference 
Indicator 
 
1 Introduction 
 
There is interest in measuring the strength of competition in different industries. One 
strand argues that the intensity of competition alters the relationships between the 
profitability of firms because output is reallocated towards more efficient firms when 
intensity of competition increases. Boone (2008) developed this idea of the output 
reallocation effect into a theoretical test, and this paper suggests a procedure for 
implementing Boone’s test, illustrated with a sample of banks in emerging economies.  
 
2 Theory 
 
Boone (2008) describes an industry where firms compete but differ in efficiency. 
Initially the firms decide whether to enter the market and then, knowing which firms 
entered in the first stage, all firms choose strategically to maximise their after entry 
profits. A sub-game perfect equilibrium is identified where profits are related to the 
firm's efficiency, and are conditional on the aggressiveness of the firms' conduct. Let  
𝜋𝜋(𝐸𝐸)  denote the profit level of a firm with efficiency level  𝐸𝐸 . Consider three firms with 
different efficiency levels:  max𝐸𝐸 ≥ 𝐸𝐸′ ≥ min𝐸𝐸  The inverse relative profit difference 
(RPD),  𝜌𝜌, represents the ratio of the difference between the profit of the typical firm 
and the profit of the least efficient firm relative to the difference between the profit of 
the most efficient and the profit of the least efficient firm: 
𝜌𝜌 = [𝜋𝜋(𝐸𝐸′) − 𝜋𝜋(min𝐸𝐸)] [𝜋𝜋(max𝐸𝐸) − 𝜋𝜋(min𝐸𝐸)]⁄                [1] 
 
 
 
 
Boone (2008) argues that more intense competition causes the term  𝜌𝜌 , the RPD, to 
fall as the intensity of competition increases.  Hence the numerator term is expected 
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to fall more than the denominator; the intuition is that when an industry becomes more 
competitive firms are punished more harshly the more they are below maximum 
efficiency, Boone (2008:1246).  
 
Boone establishes a relationship between the relative profit difference, 𝜌𝜌 which he 
calls normalised profits and the corresponding normalised efficiency, symbolised here 
as  𝜂𝜂 : 
   
𝜂𝜂 = [𝐸𝐸′ − min𝐸𝐸] [max𝐸𝐸 − min𝐸𝐸]⁄                       [2] 
 
 
This relationship:𝜌𝜌(𝜂𝜂) must shift down for all values of the normalised efficiency when 
competition becomes more intense, Boone (2008: theorem 1). Boone suggests: plot 
normalised profits against normalised efficiency for the years t and t + 1. If the area 
under the curve is smaller in t + 1 than it is in t, competition has become more intense 
in year t +1. 
 
Using a diagram like Figure 1 Boone represents an increase in competition intensity 
as a lower value for the integral under the curve: 𝜌𝜌(𝜂𝜂)  i.e.∫ 𝜌𝜌(𝜂𝜂)𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂10  .  
Boone's test is a sign criterion; in an analytical model the visual comparison of the 
areas under the relative profit difference graph, or the sign of their difference, is 
sufficient to determine the relative intensity of competition. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
In principle therefore the test is straightforward but requires comparison of the areas 
under sample scatters of points, i.e. empirical distributions. The discriminating index 
amongst different competitive regimes need not be related to time, t; it could also refer 
to different regions, or industrial sectors. For example in an industry panel data case 
study, write  𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 as the measured cost efficiency of firm  i  at time t. Rank the efficiency 
scores for a related group of firms from highest  max𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  to lowest: min𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    and 
normalising the efficiency scores, construct the following sample points. 
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𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = [𝐸𝐸′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] [𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖]⁄       𝑚𝑚 = 1 …𝑁𝑁; 𝑡𝑡 = 1 …𝑇𝑇     [3] 
  
 
This variable measures, for each firm observation, the relative efficiency compared to 
the least efficient firm, normalised by the range of efficiency scores. Associated with 
each of these normalised efficiency scores will be a relative profit difference 
observation: 
 
  𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = [𝜋𝜋(𝐸𝐸′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) − 𝜋𝜋(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)] [𝜋𝜋(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) − 𝜋𝜋(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)]       𝑚𝑚 = 1 …𝑁𝑁; 𝑡𝑡 = 1 …𝑇𝑇⁄  
            [4] 
 
The sign version of the test therefore is given by the sign of the difference in the definite 
integrals computed for two different competition regimes, A and B: 
   
Δ� = ∫ 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂 − ∫ 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂1010        [5] 
 
3 Sample procedure 
 
The efficiency scores could be computed by stochastic frontier analysis. The basic 
data are firm observations on efficiency,  𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and a measure of profitability, 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
transformed as in [3], [4]. Plot these for all pooled observations.   A way of 
implementing the test is the use of polynomial quantile regression analysis (PQR). 
Since this is an empirical integral it is appropriate to use it to estimate a theoretical 
integral. A PQR is based on the parameters 𝑞𝑞 the probability level for isolating the 
proportion of the sample lying on or below the quantile regression line and 𝑀𝑀 the 
degree of the polynomial. The choice is a compromise between inclusivity of sample 
points and avoidance of undue outlier impact. Fitting a PQR at the third quartile for a 
given selection of sample points for example ensures that 75 percent of those sample 
points lie on or below the fitted line. We suggest that the preferred specification of the 
PQR should be the one with positive first derivative and negative second derivative 
over the largest part of the domain of normalised efficiency. 
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Therefore approximate the relationship between the inverse relative profit difference 
and the normalised cost efficiency by:  
    
Pr�𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝜌𝜌(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = � 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚−1𝑚𝑚=𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
� = 𝑞𝑞 
           [6] 
This polynomial quantile regression produces an integral estimate which is a linear 
function of the quantile regression coefficients: 
   
 
� �� 𝛼𝛼�𝑚𝑚𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚−1
𝑚𝑚=𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
�
1
0
𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂 = � (𝛼𝛼�𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚⁄ ) = 𝐡𝐡′𝛂𝛂�𝑚𝑚=𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
 
 [7] 
 
Here the 𝛼𝛼� terms are the estimated coefficients from the quantile regression and the 
vector  𝐡𝐡′ is given by �1, 12,…, 1𝑀𝑀�. If the size of this integral differs for different clusters of 
sample points, then the competition regime differs in intensity between those clusters. 
 
From the variance matrix of the estimated coefficients compute the standard error of 
this integral: 
 
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 �� �� 𝛼𝛼�𝑚𝑚𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚−1
𝑚𝑚=𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
�
1
0
𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂� = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 �� (𝛼𝛼�𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚⁄ )𝑚𝑚=𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
� = (𝐡𝐡′𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑣𝑣(𝛂𝛂�)𝐡𝐡)1 2⁄  
 
[8] 
 
For two competition regimes (B: before or benchmark and A: after or alternative) the 
hypothesis of no difference in the intensity of competition is: 
   
 
𝐻𝐻0: Δ = � �� 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚−1𝑚𝑚=𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
�
1
0
𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂 − � �� 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚
𝐵𝐵 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚−1
𝑚𝑚=𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
�
1
0
𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂 = 0 
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 𝐻𝐻1:∆≠ 0 
 [9] 
 
This can be tested by the use of intercept and slope dummy variables applied to the 
pooled sample.  
 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = � 0:    𝑚𝑚, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐵𝐵 ⇒ 𝛂𝛂𝐵𝐵 = 𝛂𝛂1: 𝑚𝑚, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐴𝐴 ⇒ 𝛂𝛂𝐴𝐴 = 𝛂𝛂 + 𝛃𝛃      [10] 
 
The PQR form with these dummy variables is: 
  
Pr�𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ � 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚−1𝑚𝑚=𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
+ � 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚−1 × 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝑚𝑚=𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
� = 𝑞𝑞 
 [11] 
 
Then, for the benchmark and the alternative regimes, test: 𝐻𝐻0: ∆= 𝐡𝐡′𝛃𝛃 = 0 by using 
the Wald statistic for one restriction: 
 
𝑊𝑊 = �𝐡𝐡′𝛃𝛃�� �𝐡𝐡′ �𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑣𝑣�𝛃𝛃���𝐡𝐡�−1 �𝐡𝐡′𝛃𝛃��    [12] 
 
 
4 Empirical example 
 
We illustrate with a sample of banking systems in emerging economies: 485 banks in 
34 emerging economies over the period 2005-2008 collated from the Bankscope 
database, see Duygun et al (2013). The banks were the largest in each country and 
passed filter tests including deposits exceeding loans in order to focus on the 
commercial banks only.  
 
Using the variables: costs, outputs, i.e. loans, securities and off-balance sheet income, 
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input prices, i.e. price of funds, labour and fixed assets, equity capital and time, we 
derived a stochastic frontier analysis efficiency measure by estimating the short run 
total cost function. The error component model includes idiosyncratic error   and 
inefficiency, see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003). In our example of banks in emerging 
countries we have derived cost efficiency measures for each bank  𝑚𝑚  in each country 
at time  𝑡𝑡  , for a range of different efficiency measurement methodologies and 
measures of profitability, such as net interest margin, return on assets, return on equity 
and shadow return on equity capital. Using Braeutigam and Daughety (1983) and 
Hughes et al (2001), we interpret the negative of the elasticity of cost with respect to 
equity capital as the shadow return on equity. There is a strong argument for using 
this measure of profitability since it reflects the banks' attitude to the riskiness of their 
loan portfolios.  
 
We then proceeded by sorting and normalising the data on efficiency 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and 
profitability 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in order to calculate the normalised efficiency and the relative profit 
differences1 for the sample:(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  as shown in equations [3] and [4]. We then 
estimated the quantile regressions and carried out the Wald test shown in equations 
[6] to [12] for the hypotheses shown in equation [9]. 
 
In the test illustrated here, we focus on a particular part of the sample, the banks in 
economies preparing for EU and eventual Eurozone entry. There are 10 banking 
systems2 in this subsample comprising 496 observations. The annual convergence 
criteria reports of the European Central Bank, ECB (1996-2014), confirm that from 
2004 onwards these countries were engaged in restructuring their banking systems in 
anticipation of accession to the EU and adoption of the Euro, therefore they represent 
a subsample of market participants likely to display increasing competitive pressures 
in an environment where each is opening up to similar external deregulation 
incentives. 
 
In selecting this subsample for measuring increased competition through the impact 
on the profit-efficiency relationship we must avoid confusing the picture with the effect 
                                                 
1 Normalised efficiency observations are in the unit interval, but sample data for RPD need not be. 
2 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
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of the global financial crisis. The crisis in developed EU banking systems took serious 
hold from the bank bailouts and the Lehman Brothers collapse which date from late 
2008. To ensure that the test is not contaminated by events in late 2008 we first 
compare two overlapping periods: 2005-2007 and 2006-2008 to calculate RPDs. Then 
we compare 2006-08 with the base year 2005 for the Wald test. In this way we seek 
to test whether the whole period 2006-8 can be identified with a change in the strength 
of competition as the ECB guidance started to have an impact on the banking systems 
preparing for EU entry and Euro adoption. 
 
Table 1 presents these results. Choosing a quantile value of 0.75 to compromise 
between inclusivity and avoidance of outliers, we find statistically significant fits for the 
quadratic quantile regressions. The difference in the RPD integrals comparing 2006-
08 with 2005-07 is ∆�   = -0.715, more than four times the individual standard errors. 
 
Comparing 2006-08 with 2005, 𝐻𝐻0: Δ = 0   i.e. no increase in the relative strength of 
competition is rejected at below the one percent significance level. Therefore we may 
conclude that the statistically significant contraction in the empirical estimates of the 
RPD integrals is not inconsistent with the hypothesis that competition had 
strengthened in 2006-08. 
 
Table 1 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
We suggest a procedure for applying the Boone (2008) relative profit difference test 
of the strength of competition. Boone’s test compares the areas under plots of 
normalised efficiency and normalised profitability, corresponding to two different 
competition regimes. A pooled sample is separated into clusters by using polynomial 
quantile regressions for a chosen percentage of the sample points to derive measures 
of the areas under the curves, together with standard errors and Wald tests of the 
statistical significance of their difference. We applied this to a panel of banking 
systems preparing for EU entry prior to the global financial crisis.  Our finding that 
there is a statistically significant shift in the empirical estimates of the RPD integrals is 
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not inconsistent with the hypothesis that competition had strengthened in 2006-8. 
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 Figure 1: The theoretical relationship between normalised profit (relative profit 
difference) and normalised efficiency, based on Boone (2008) figure 2, p. 1252 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Competition intensifies 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 ≡ 𝜌𝜌 = �𝜋𝜋(𝐸𝐸′) − 𝜋𝜋(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸)� �𝜋𝜋(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸) − 𝜋𝜋(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸)��  
 
0 
1 
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 Table 1: Quantile regressions at 75 percent level  
 
 
Moving windows 2005-7 & 2006-8 RPD (ρ) 2005-7 RPD (ρ) 2006-8 
   
normalised efficiency (η) 6.464** 11.267*** 
square of normalised efficiency (η2) -4.492** -7.745*** 
constant 2.799*** 0.766 
   
NT 352 356 
   
Boone RPD integral: ∫ 𝜌𝜌�(𝜂𝜂)𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂10 :  4.533 3.818 
SE (Boone RPD integral):  0.173 0.174 
Difference in RPD integrals: ∆� :  -0.715 
Wald test of 2006-8 compared with 
2005   
Difference in RPD integrals: ∆� :  -1.127 
Wald test of H0:  Δ= 0 F(1,465): 12.37*** 
 p-value 0.0005 
   
* p <0.05; ** p< 0.01; *** p< 0.001 
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